Starting in Minneapolis on June 3 and rapidly spreading to Los Angeles and elsewhere around the country, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids have provoked angry community responses. Although this wave of action appeared to peak with the “No Kings” demonstrations of June 14, ICE agents continue to abduct people and people continue to resist. In this account, participants in a series of clashes in and around Seattle describe how they have prevented ICE from kidnapping people at court appearances, demonstrating a way forward for the movement.

Against the Border and Its World

The following is a report-back from autonomous individuals describing actions against la migra in Seattle (Coast Salish land). We do not claim to speak on behalf of others, nor “the movement” as a whole.

Between the escalation of the 76-year-running genocide against Palestine and the escalating attacks on immigrants here on Turtle Island, it is increasingly obvious that borders kill. Against the claims of both liberals and conservatives that borders are necessary, we hold up an anti-colonial analysis: not only is migration an essential part of life for humans as well as so many other living creatures, but in our context, migrants often represent an Indigenous force threatening a settler-colonial reality.

All of this is captured in the words of Palestinian Ahmed Abu Artema:

I looked at the birds flying over the fences. Birds decide to fly and fly. I have discovered the real reason for abhorring the occupation. I hate it because it contradicts the laws of nature.

As writers with anarchist tendencies, we are not interested in “demonstration”—pleading about our suffering at the hands of our so-called leaders. We do not believe that the people are weaker than the police or even the state as a whole. If we reject these borders, we must do it wholeheartedly—not with empty marches and rhetorical condemnations, but with solidarity, love, and a dedication to militant tactics. We quote Diane Di Prima:

when you seize a town, a campus, get hold of the power
stations, the water, the transportation,
forget to negotiate, forget how
to negotiate, don’t wait for De Gaulle or Kirk
to abdicate, they won’t, you are not
‘demonstrating’ you are fighting
a war, fight to win, don’t wait for Johnson or
Humphrey or Rockefeller to agree to your terms
take what you need, ‘it’s free
because it’s yours’

So-called Seattle presents several different realities for migrants and migrant communities. Though gentrification has whitened much of central Seattle, South Seattle and the suburbs beyond it remain a vibrant place for migrant community-building and organizing, as are the suburbs north of the city.

Being located within a hundred miles of the Canadian border and the Pacific Ocean places Seattle within the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement in a way that is legally distinct from most of Turtle Island. Some of the worst facilities belonging to la migra are located immediately south of the Seattle area. With a capacity for nearly 1600 detainees, the Northwest Detention Center (in Tacoma) is privately owned by incarceration profiteer GEO Group. The Federal Detention Center (in Sea-Tac) also holds migrant detainees. While all prisons are violent, unjust institutions, the Tacoma Northwest Detention Center (NWDC) is particularly vile, routinely investigated for formal human rights violations such as a lack of medical attention and dangerously unsanitary conditions. It is also one of the largest detention facilities in the country, holding migrants from all over the Pacific Northwest. Despite Seattle’s claim to be a sanctuary city, police regularly aid in migrant detainment,¹ assaulting protestors who attempt to halt the deportation machine.

The events of June 10-15, six days of militant action in Seattle and Tukwila, cannot be separated from the stories of mutual aid and community support networks set up long before Trump was elected. To share a single example from centuries of migrant defense work in the area, the years immediately before 2025 saw an influx of migrants to the Seattle area, particularly people of Angolan, Congolese, and Venezuelan descent, who were repeatedly denied social services and basic needs by the state. The self-organization of these migrants in creating encampments and placing pressure on the state set the tone for the broader community pitching in. The community ties and trust built during that period are fundamental to the relationships, knowledge, and militancy we see in 2025.

A Spreading Fire: The LA Uprisings and Militancy in Seattle

On May 20, ICE showed up at the Seattle Federal Building, where migrants had been attending immigration hearings, with the intention of fast-tracking their kidnappings. They aimed to take several migrants daily from a place they were legally required to attend. That day, a call to action circulated to counter the ICE presence with a mass turnout at the Federal Building. Over the ensuing four weeks, legal support and other resources were concentrated on the building, as well as daily rallies. We do not claim to understand all the political realities and work folks were doing on the ground during those weeks, nor do we mean to disrespect it. However, the rallies outside, with a large liberal contingent and usually not posing a direct threat to the state’s violence, were not changing the on-the-ground reality. Protesters were standing outside the site of daily kidnappings, but nothing was changing.

The uprisings in Los Angeles that began on June 6 were not simply a call to action. They were a call to arms, reminding comrades of their responsibility to defend one another against state violence.

On June 10, protesters answering a standard call to oppose ICE kidnappings at the federal building responded to news of three abductions at immigration court by blocking all the vehicle exits to the building. Impromptu barricades were assembled out of Lime rental scooters and other garbage. Around 8 pm, federal agents feinted an attack on one side of the building, only to rush the other side from outside in several unmarked vans as protesters surged towards the site of the feint. Vehicles struck two protesters and a line of cops pushed the protest line back. During the struggle, a large van left the building with the abductees trapped inside. Comrades continued to barricade the building, unsure whether abductees remained inside. In the aftermath, two protesters were arrested and a third successfully de-arrested; this galvanized the crowd to remain in defense of their comrades. Around 10 pm, people pulled the American flag down from the flagpole and burned it. Shortly after midnight, the arrestees were released, the federal agents left the building to the normal overnight security guards, and the protesters dispersed.

After the daylong confrontation of June 10, calls continued to go out for full-day presence at the Federal Building. From June 11 on, the federal government closed some sections of the building, sometimes sending workers home or delaying key services. Immigration hearings remained scheduled, however. On June 11, there were hearings scheduled in the morning and the mid-afternoon, and a mass rally led by PSL was scheduled for 7 pm at a nearby park.

A small, dedicated crowd set up barricades near the garages as the 1 pm appointments began, having learned the lesson that ICE prefers to exit already hidden in their protected vehicles. There had been no sightings yet: the barricades were preventative. The 1 pm hearings came and went, and all of the migrants were allowed to leave! There was a flagpole that had been left bare by the burning of the American flag the previous day. People ran a non-binary flag up it; police repeatedly tried and failed to cut it down. As the cops learned, if you cut both sides of a flag rope high enough that you can no longer reach either side, you have trapped the flag at full mast.

Tension ramped up as the afternoon hearings began. Now there were more and bigger barricades, comprised primarily of zip-tied Lime bikes and heavy street grates. Seattle police responded with force almost instantly when bicycles were positioned at the same exit via which ICE had successfully rushed out vans the previous day. The Seattle cops expended a considerable amount of mace or pepper spray at the base of the garage, which quickly spread not to only those constructing barricades but to the crowd that was observing from above. This time, no ICE rush followed the use of spray. No arrests were made; medics quickly treated those who had been sprayed; and within 30 minutes, the barricades were back in place, this time a few feet further back from the garage.

The final appointment of the day came and went. All of the migrants had gotten out of the building successfully! The protesters began to leave, preparing for the evening’s action at a nearby park.

That action had been called by the Party for Socialism and Liberation, hoping to capitalize on the broad public energy against ICE. PSL has a reputation in Seattle for non-confrontation: in reaction, autonomous folks circulated their own call declaring that they would not be co-opted and demanding militancy at the action.

Roughly 5000 strong, the PSL gathering was originally called as a rally, but it became a march to the federal building. Conflict between PSL and autonomous factions was a theme of the night. Some believe that autonomous pressure influenced the decision to march, holding that the original intention of the PSL organizers was only to rally. In any case, an attempt by mixed-status autonomous folks to gain the megaphone early on ended with PSL marshals physically assaulting them. Upon reaching the federal building, PSL organizers told the crowd to disperse, and the vast majority of attendees did so. Nonetheless, several hundred more radical comrades remained—surrounding the building, tagging it, and breaking at least one window. Before long, Seattle police sent a line of cops, who issued a dispersal order.

The police response was effectively delayed by about half an hour when some comrades set a dumpster on fire and pushed it between the cops and the crowd. Once the Seattle Fire Department had dealt with the fire, the cops temporarily retreated. The crowd pursued them away from the federal building; seeing the trailing cops running to catch up to their fellows reinvigorated the crowd. However, the cops turned and began advancing aggressively again, grabbing several comrades who were near them and isolated. As other comrades fell back, the cops successfully pushed forward into an intersection adjacent to the federal building, splitting the crowd three ways.

The crowd could have moved around the partial police occupation of the intersection to reconvene as a single mass, or else proceeded to independent objectives, but instead, everyone stayed where they were. When, after some delay, the cops pushed further, the crowd was not cohesive enough to resist. Officers shot pepper balls and pepper spray at people and made several arrests.

The five days following June 11 saw the same relative quiet that characterized the earlier part of that day. Although DHS cracked down on observers entering the building, sometimes restricting access to both court observers and those independently seeking social services, they did not detain anyone inside the federal building.

A few tactical suggestions derived from the events at the Federal Building:

• Move first and militantly: if the tactics your crew demonstrates make sense, others will improvise on them. A riot only requires one person throw the first stone.
• It’s important to skill up on tactical formation, especially when it comes to retreating and defending one another from police.
• Bring extra personal protective equipment (gas masks, goggles, and the like) for new folks and others who have forgotten them! Remember, for sporadic actions, comrades may be coming directly from work without their full gear bags.
• Develop modes of on-the-ground communication for unplanned actions, especially when radio or tech communications don’t make sense.
• Meet with your friends off the streets before you meet them on the streets. Don’t just bring a protest buddy—make a protest plan. While concerns for operational security are valid, it may be worth planning with more than just your two- or four-person crew if a full-scale confrontation with ICE and the police department seems possible.
• Remember our collective strength; use offensive tactics. Successfully dispersing a crowd of 5000 is a dangerous and difficult task for the police.

ICE Retreats to Tukwila

With detentions at the Seattle facility at least temporarily paused, it was unclear what ICE would do next. Unintentional false reports reflected fears that every major police stationing indicated a coming ICE raid; police cars and unmarked vehicles were misreported as “confirmed ICE.” You can access information about how to correctly identify ICE vehicles here; this should have been spread far and wide long before June 10.

On June 13, migrant families began receiving orders to arrive at the Tukwila Citizenship and Immigration Services center the weekend of June 14-15, roughly five miles south of Seattle. The orders allegedly confused even Tukwila police, who originally put out a statement declaring the building closed, though that was later deleted. Whether that was an intentional effort to depress protester turnout or the consequence of genuine confusion, it only increased the suspicion that ICE would be trying to kidnap people there. A call circulated widely to maintain a presence there the whole day, from 8 am to 4 pm.

In retrospect, the unspecific call for continuous, all-day presence was an error repeated from the federal building protests. The goal of ICE in any detention was clear: once they detained people inside the building, ICE would need to punch through any line of protesters to transfer the detainees south, whether to Sea-Tac or the NWDC. As the federal building, this meant that the most obvious strategy was to establish a barricade, whether human or material. Eight hours is a long time for any individual to actively engage in the tasks that make a barricade possible, and lacking prospects of reinforcements left people poorly prepared for a late afternoon or evening ICE assault.

The decision ICE made to move south made sense for several reasons. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, many federal buildings were designed with utmost security in mind: consequently, the Tukwila Citizenship and Immigration Services building is on a long road with few residential exits. In comparison to Seattle’s Federal Building, the Tukwila building had few publicly accessible buildings nearby—any protesters or migrants would have difficulty exiting inconspicuously.

ICE may have also moved south to keep the largely liberal No Kings protest, a mass action that drew over 20,000 attendees, apart from the more militant activists intent on stopping the kidnapping of their neighbors. No Kings had been scheduled to start at the same location as the June 11 mass action earlier in the week. Perhaps the success of a more militant block against the PSL peace police on June 11 informed ICE’s decision to separate the two actions geographically.

Tukwila offered one advantage for those resisting ICE, however: there were only two narrow exits via which ICE vehicles could leave the facility. The autonomous attendees, who numbered two hundred or more throughout the day, coalesced around a human barricade at each exit, only letting out cars that were verified to not contain migrants. While these barricades were set up and coordinated, legal support and other administrative support for migrants set up near the center of the building. Legal support and other contingents worked respectfully with those defending the barricades, with solidarity and a diversity of tactics generally respected on both sides.

La Policía, La Migra, La Misma Porquería

Tukwila police continued the theme of city police providing the bodies and munitions to facilitate ICE kidnappings. Within an hour of assembling at the CIS building, those gathering at the building confronted a crew of Federal Protective Services (DHS) officers and Tukwila PD demanding that they move to the sidewalk. Though this was not a dispersal order, it set the tone: as migrant communities and their allies have long known, the pigs, DHS, and ICE work hand in hand.

Tukwila PD also posed a significant threat, trained and prepared for protest engagement, as well as having better integration with the county jail system than DHS or ICE.

Fortunately, this meant that the ability of ICE to transport from the building was limited by the capacity and willingness to engage of the local police. As fewer and fewer people want to be police, even the overstaffed police departments of the colonial US can be overwhelmed by the task of continuously defending ICE operations.

Confrontation at Tukwila

Though many migrants were able to check in for their appointments at the Tukwila building and leave safely, by midday, it became clear that two people who had entered might no longer be free to leave. When the last of appointments closed for the day with the two migrants still unreleased, a group rallied at the front to demand their freedom.

By this point, a significant barricade presence had been established at both the north and south exits from the building. A local auto body shop agreed to donate extra car parts and the parking vendor agreed to donate trash cans and no parking signs. With the support of the community, the federal mercenaries faced barricades of found objects bound together with zip ties, chain, and black tape.

By late afternoon, ICE and DHS had made their decision. Rather than releasing the detainees, they would assault the crowd in order to get the vans out past them to a more long-term detention center. The federal agents called in Tukwila PD, which closed the only road connecting the building on both sides. Tukwila PD provided little warning before using munitions to attack protesters, releasing flashbangs, pepper balls, and tear gas on a crowd that had done nothing but stand in the way of ICE.

At first, the barricades seemed to hold, and this bought the protesters enough time to regroup and hold their lines through the first few rounds of Tukwila PD fire. Tukwila police made one arrest during their first attempts to disperse the crowd, though that person was later released under crowd pressure. Eventually, unfortunately, the defenses failed, as ICE vehicles rushed the corner of the barricade while police deployed tear gas, a smoke bomb, and flash-bang grenades. The three cars escaped from the lot and onto the road, escorted by Tukwila PD. Though ICE chose not to engage the following day, our neighbors had been kidnapped.

This is Not a Threat, It is a Shield

The direct action of June 9-14 represents at least a temporary success.

ICE may find new, creative strategies to kidnap and transfer migrants, and they may succeed in ramping up transfers through Seattle or Tukwila. This is especially likely if direct action is carelessly set aside in favor of more liberal strategies. Yet so far, the militancy people have shown in resisting transfers and detainments at the Federal Building and in Tukwila has presented an obstacle that the state is not prepared to consistently overcome. With SPD forced to mobilize its entire demonstration unit on June 11 and Tukwila PD likely mobilizing a similar percentage of its officers for June 14, our resistance has achieved a significant drain on state resources. This is why ICE kidnappings at the federal building have been paused, and why there were no Tukwila ICE detentions on June 15, although families had been summoned to Tukwila for ICE appointments on June 14 and 15.

At the same time, the state succeeded in transferring several captives on June 10 (in Seattle) and at least one on June 14 (in Tukwila). This gives us cause to revisit our tactics, which were primarily defensive and static at both locations. Autonomous community members designed barricades with found materials and community support, intending to hold a line and resist police assault. This provided an obvious target for the state to attack. Guerrilla strategy generally rejects head-to-head conflict and attempts to hold territory in favor of taking advantage of the massive area that the state has to defend. Through flexibility and dedication, resistance can spread enemy forces thin. This is commonly reflected in the mantra that a hundred ten-person protests are better than a single one-thousand-person protest. Groups of ten can choose where and how to engage based on opportunities, calculating their actions to take advantage of weaknesses in the response of the state, as the state surely cannot defend against all of them.

How could we employ this kind of strategy in migrant defense? When ICE shows up to kidnap our neighbors, the roles are reversed. It is no longer the state that must defend hundreds of fronts; instead, every workplace, home, and school becomes a front that we have to defend. It might in fact be possible to defend every home: canvassing with know-your-rights flyers, building rapid response networks, and creating trust across local neighborhoods enhances the ability of every micro-community to respond to ICE activity. However, it could be more strategic to take the offensive, identifying key spots at which the deportation machine can be interrupted.

Though this draws on elements of guerrilla philosophy (maintain the offensive, find weak points in the infrastructure of the state), it also opens up new questions. The Federal Building and the Tukwila CIS center hardly represent the weakest points of the state. Nor do they offer easy, quick, or untraceable entrance and exit routes: in fact, disrupting them has required hours-long occupations, during any point of which the state could fire on us. Can we maintain the offensive, and at the same time “be like water” under such conditions? What tactical innovations or new skills would that require?

We ask our comrades to consider the following questions:

• How does a place and time of engagement directly stop or slow state violence?
• How can the form, location, and time of engagement minimize losses, so that an action can be repeated dozens or hundreds of times?
• If barricades or “occupation” (a loaded term on stolen land) become necessary, how can we ensure that anti-fascists set the pace of conflict, rather than the state? How can the state be kept on the defensive while anti-fascists are holding a defensive line?
• Is there some target that, if it were threatened, ICE and DHS mercenaries would be obliged to prioritize defending over their own offensive operations targeting immigrants?
• How can we develop skills, relationships, and institutions such as jail support and scouting networks that will be needed to engage the state before they are necessary for an action?
• How can relationships and planning facilitate showing up to an event with strategy and coordination already in place?

The direct actions of June 9 through 14 were not the beginning of migrant defense in so-called Seattle—nor will they be the last of it. People have continued to mobilize to the Seattle and Tukwila federal buildings, and are watching out for ICE activity in other areas. This report-back captures only a sliver in time, in order to help others learn from our failures and successes.

Carry on resisting. Chinga la migra.